University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers

Wharton Faculty Research

6-1988

The Implications of Insurance for the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy
Andrew B. Abel
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance Commons, Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Taxation
Commons

Recommended Citation
Abel, A. B. (1988). The Implications of Insurance for the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy. The Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 55 (2), 339-378. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/253335

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/170
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

The Implications of Insurance for the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy
Abstract
Various tax policies provide consumers with forms of insurance. Social security has the payoff
characteristics of an annuity. The income tax provides consumers with a degree of Income insurance
because the government shares part of the individual's income risk. Redistributive taxes can be used to
spread aggregate income risks across different generations The effects of these and other tax policies
are shown to depend crucially on the nature of existing private insurance arrangements.

Disciplines
Economics | Finance | Finance and Financial Management | Taxation

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/170

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

THE IMPLICATIONS OF INSURANCE FOR
THE EFFICACY OF FISCAL POLICY

Andrew B. Abel

Working Paper No. 2517

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
February 1988

This paper was prepared for presentation to the American Risk and Insurance Association
in Montreal, August 16, 1987.
I
thank J. David Curmnins for discussion and Stephen
Zeldes and Stanley Fischer for cornents on an earlier draft. Financial support from
the National Science Foundation, the Sloan Foundation, and the Amoco Foundation Term
Professorship in Finance is gratefully acknowledged. The research reported here is
part of the NBERs research program in Economic Fluctuations. Any opinions expressed
are those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

NBER Working Paper #2517
February 1988

The Implications of Insurance for
the Efficacy of Fiscal Policy

ABSTRACT

Various tax policies provide consumers with forms of insurance.
Social security has the payoff characteristics of an annuity.

The

income tax provides consumers with a degree of income insurance because
the government shares part of the individuals income risk.
Redistributive taxes can be used to spread aggregate income risks across
different generations.

The effects of these and other tax policies are

shown to depend crucially on the nature of existing private insurance
arrangements

Andrew Abel
Department of Finance
The Wharton School
Steinberg Hall, Room 2319
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104

1

I.

Introduction

What does insurance have to do with the macroeconomic effects of
fiscal policy?

To an economist schooled in the traditional Keynesian

multiplier analysis, the answer would be a resounding "nothing!"

In the

simplest Keynesian paradigm, the effects of fiscal policy are analyzed
using the multiplier, which is based on a simple marginal propensity to

conume,

The role of uncertainty--not to mention insurance--

all apparent in this analysis.

is

not at

However, macroeconomics and the analysis

of fiscal policy have progressed well beyond this simple framework.
Consumption behavior continues to be stressed in analyzing the effects of
fiscal policy, but the mechanisms chat are currently emphasized are quite
different from chose in the early Keynesian framework,
Most recent theoretical research on the effects of fiscal

poLiy

proceeds by examining the effects of fiscal policy on the consumption and
portfolio decisions of individual consumers.

The macroeconomic effects

of fiscal policy are then determined by aggregating the behavior of
individual consumers.

If all consumers are identical, then, of course,

aggregation is particularly simple.

Alternatively, if, as in much of the

research presented below, there is heterogeneity among consumers, then
the aggregation of individual behavior must explicitly take account of
general equilibrium considerations and market-clearing relations.
The preferred frameworks for analyzing individual consumption
behavior are the life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg L22 and the
permanent income model of Friedman l2J.

Each of these approaches is

based on explicit utility maximization by an individual consumer subject
to the constraints that face that consumer.

The important insight shared

by these theories is that consumers form their consumption decisions on
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the basis of their lifetime income rather than simply their current
income as in the Keynesian consumption function.

Optimal consumption

behavior requires consumers to forecast their future after-tax incomea.
Therefore, in responding to a tax change, for example, consumers must
forecast the future course of taxes as well as the current tax,

Because

future incomea and taxes are not perfectly predictable, there is a demand
by tisk-averse consumers for insurance. The savings and consumption

of individual consumers will be greatly affected by whether
insurance of various types is available and, if ao, at what price. In

decisions

particular, the responses of individual consumers to various changes in
taxea

depend on the nature of available insurance arrangements.
In discussing the importance of insurance arrangements, a broad

definition of insurance will be used.

For the purposes of this paper,

insurance will he defined as amy contingent arrangement that allows
individual consumers to mitigate random fluctuations in marginal utility.
This definition ia deliberately general in order to convey the view that
insights about insurance can be applied to questions that at first glance
do not appear to have anything to do with insurance.
The majority of this paper is devoted to situations in which
individuals face idiosyncratic risks.

More precisely, much of the

analysis examines situations in which a group of individuals all face the
aeme ex ante probability distribution for a random variable; but, cx
post, different members of the group obtain different realizations of the
random variable,

If each individual's realization of this random

variable were publicly obsenable,

there would evidently be soope for

private insurance markets to pool these idiosynoratio risks.

By

contrast, the last pert of this paper will ignore idiosyncratic risks and
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will focus instead on aggregate risks, in which all members of
experience the same realization of the random variable.

a

cohort

In this

situation, the scope for private insurance is less evident, but

a

fiscal

authority could provide insurance.
The particular risks analyzed in this paper are of three sorts.
The first risk, which is discussed in section II, is associated with the
fact that individuals do not know in advance exactly when they will die.
After analyzing the implications of this individual longevity risk for
individual saving and the distribution of wealth, this framework is used
to analyze the effects of social security in the presence of alternative
private insurance arrangements. The second risk, discussed in section
III,

is associated with the unpredictability of future income, and it

gives rise to precautionary saving.

An income tax provides a form of

insurance against fluctuations in income and thus mitigates the need for
precautionary saving.

This interaction of the insurance aspects of the

income tax and saving behavior has important implications for the effects
of fiscal policy.

The third risk, which is analyzed in section IV, is a

cohort-wide income risk that cannot be shared in private insurance
arrangements.

However, a fiscal system of taxes and transfers can be

established to share this risk optimally across generations.

After

presenting the features of an optimal system, the viability of such a

-

system is discussed.

IL

Longevity Risk

Before analyzing the saving behavior of consumers in the presence
of longevity risk, it is useful to summarize briefly the implications of
the life-cycle model under the assumption that each consumer knows in
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advance how long he or she will live.
fundamental components.

The life-cycle model has two

First, each individual cares about lifetime

utility and, consequently, attempts to have a smooth profile of
consumption over his or her lifetime.

Second, there is a typical life-

cycle pattern of income in which individuals earn labor income during
early and middle adulthood and are retired in late adulthood.

In order

to qckieve the same level of consumption during retirement as during
working years, it is necessary for individuals to save some of their
labor income and accumulate wealth during their working years.

is

wealth

Then chic

gradually decumulated to provide for consumption during

retirement,
In

a particularly restrictive form of the life-cycle model,

consumers are assumed not to have bequest motives.

it is optimal for a consumer to end life with precisely zero

then,

this implication is simply not borne out by the data.
the implication that consumers die holding zoro wealth is perhaps

wealth.

While
too

However,

strong to be expected to hold exactly,

that

In this formulation

many

consumers decumulate wealth far too slowly,

studies have indicated
or not at all.

Does

this failure of elderly consumers to decumulata their wealth indicate the
importance of a bequest motive, does it indicate an imperfection in life
and/or health insurance markets2, or does it indicate some more basic
flaw in the model?

Although this question is still waiting for a

definitive answer, recent research, which has focussed on the role of
insurance markets and bequest motives, has produced a rich array of

for example, Kotlikoff and Summers [21).
Davies [8] calibrated a theoretical model to actual mortality
probabilities and comcluded that the uncertainty about one's date of
death could potentially explain the failure of elderly consumers to
dissave.
1
2

See,

insights.
A.

Absence of Private Annuities

To begin the study of saving and bequests under uncertain
longevity, it is convenient to start with as simple a model as possible.
This model is taken from Abel [1).

A

similar model of individual

behavior, which does not include a capital stock, is analyzed in
Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled [10).
Suppose that each consumer can live for at most two periods.

For

the moment, assume that a consumer does not have a bequest motive and
cannot buy life insurance or annuities.
consumer receives an inheritance,

I,

In the first period, the

and inelastically supplies one unit

of labor thereby earning labor income Y.

Also in the first period, the

consumer pays a tax T and consumes an amount

c.

Therefore, the

consumer's total wealth at the end of the first period of life, which is
denoted by W, is
W

l+YTc

(1)

Suppose that this wealth is held in the form of riskless capital
and let R denote the gross rate of return on wealth between the first anc
second period.
life,

Thus, at the beginning of the second potential period of

the consumer's wealth, including accrued
interest, is R W.

beginning of the second potential period of life,
birth to C heirs.

At the

the consumer gives

After the C heirs are born, the uncertainty about the

consumer's longevity is resolved. With probability p. the consumer dies
at the beginning of the second period and the consumer's estate is
divided equally among the

G

heirs;

thus each heir receives R W/G.

Alternatively, with probability l-p, the consumer survives.
surviving consumer receives a social security benefit S.

Each

Knowing that

this is

the last period of his or her life,

the consumer consumes

distriE

Letting x denote the consumption in the second pe

his resources.

inherit
life,

it follows

hat

Equation

becsusE

R1I+Y-T-c)+S

RW±S

x

(2)

Subs cit

(2) is the consumer's lifetime budget constraint

consuirç

next step is to specify the consumer's utility function.

It is

convenient to use the following special case of the Ysari (26]

u

function
type 0
U

In

where 0 < D < I is
preference.

(I-c)

c

a

D In x

(3)

discount factor representing the pure rate c

The utility of old age consumption is discounted hot

consumi
because of time preference and because of uncertainty.

The weig
inherit

is the probability of aurvi'al.

oonsumr
To derive the optimal consumption in the first period, sub
consume

the budget constraint (2) into the utility function (3) so that

I

margins
of expected lafetime 2tility depends only on consumption when yot
Differentiating this expression with respect to c and setting th
derivative equal to zero yields the optimal level of consumption
a [I
where a

l/(l+(I-p)D).

Y

- T + S/R]

wealth

(4)

by the
The coefficient a, which is between zeH

one, is the marginal propensity to consume out of lifetime resou
Note that, in calculating the present of value of lifetime resou
social security benefit S is discounted by the riskless rate of
__________________________
3 The utility function in (3) can be interpreted as the expecte

value of lifetime utility. Under this interpretation, it is imp
assumed in (3) that if the consumer dies at the beginning of the
More gener
period, then second-period utility is equal to zero.
where
is th
ln c + (l-p) D in x + p D
could write (3) as U
of second-period utility if the consumer dies young. For the pu
deriving the optimal behavior of the consumer, the value of
irrelevant,

i

in (8)

type

j

inherit
general
inherit

was a

I

received by a type

ii)

-

R

j

consumer is

W3/G

(10)

Equation (10) relates the inheritance of a type j consumer to the
wealth of a type j-l consumer. Using this relation to substitute for the
inheritance in (9) yields
+

(1-a)

R

(11)

-Equation (11) can be used to solve for the wealth of all consumers.
Technically, it is a first-order linear constant coefficient difference
This equation can be

equation with the boundary condition given by (7).
easily solved.

It can be shown that the wealth of a young type j

consumer,

increases monoconically in

j

and,

if (l-a)R/C < 1, it

approaches a finite limit as j approaches infinity.

Rather than present

the complete solution here4, it is convenient to focus on the average

value of

in the steady state, which is denoted as W*.

It can be

shown that

0/[l-(l-a)pR/Gj

(12)

The variable W* is an interesting macroeconomic quantity;

in

particular, it is the per capita value of the private capital stock2

To

see that W* is the per capita stock of private capital, recall that
surviving old consumers consume all of their resources. Thus, all
private saving in the economy is done by young consumers.

Since capital

is the only asset in this economy, the saving of young consumers, which
averages W* per capita, is equal to the private capital stock.
This simple model endogenously generates a cross-sectional
distribution of wealth.

The mechanism generating the cross-sectional

See Abel [1J for a complete solution.
Strictly speaking, W* is equal to the total private capital stock of
the economy divided by the number of young consumers, rather than divided
by the total number of consumers.
4
5

variation is that a fraction p of each cohort of consumers dies young and
thus leaves accidental bequests to their heirs,

in this model, all of

tha cross-sectional variation in wealth results from cross-sectional
variation in bequests.

An additional feature of this model ia that it

predicts a potentially aubstantial ratio of bequests to total private
wealth.

Indeed,

since a fraction p

of

esoh type of consumer diea young,

the ratio of bequests to total private wealth is equal to p.
Fully Funded Social
is quite simple,

a

Seturi

Although the model presented above

it provides some important insights into the effects of

social insurance program.

In particular, this model can he used to

examine the effects on consumption, capital accumulation and the
distribution of wealth of either a fully funded or a pay-as-you-go social
security system.
First, consider the effects of a fully funded social security
system.

In such a system,

the government collects a tax T from each

young consumer and investa the proceeds in capital.

In the next period,

the social ascurity fund is worth FT and is distributed evenly to the
surviving members of the cohort of elderly consumers. Thus, each
surviving consumer receives a social security payment S such that

FT

(l-p)S

(13)

The effects of the introduction of social security can be evaluated
by comparing the equilibrium values of variables under the social
security system with the values that these variables would attain in the
absence of social security (with T

S

0).

The consumption of type 0

consumers can be calculated by substituting the relation between the
social security parameters S and T in (13) into (6) to obtain

c0

-

a

(Y

+ pT/(1—p)}

(14)

Inspection of (14) reveals that the introduction of fully funded
social security increases the consumption of young type 0 consumers
by
apT/(l-p).

This increase in consumption reflects the intra-cohort risk

pooling of the social security system.

Each consumer contributes

1'

to

the social security system, but a fraction p of each cohort dies
young
and thereby surrenders its claim to social security benefits to the

remiing

fraction 1-p of the cohort.

Thus, risk pooling increases the

present value of lifetime resources of each survivor by pT/(l-p).
Multiplying this increase in lifetime resources by the marginal
propensity to consume, a, yields the increase in consumption of young
type 0 consumers
The wealth held by young type 0 consumers can be calculated by
substituting the relation between the social security parameters S ann T
from (13) into equation (7) to obtain

—

(l-a)Y

-

T

-

a p T/(l-p)

(15)

The introduction of fully funded social security reduces the wealth
held by young type 0 consumers, and this reduction in wealth is
decomposed into two parts in (15).

First, even if a young type 0

consumer maintained consumption unchanged with the introduction of social
security, the consumer's wealth would decline by the amount of the soca1
security tax, because first-period disposable income is reduced by T.

Furthermore,

as explained above, a young type 0 consumer increases

consumption by apT/(l-p), which reduces saving by an additional apT/(l-

Because the saving of young type 0 consumers is reduced
by the
introduction of fully funded social security, those type 0 consumers who
die young leave smaller bequests in the presence of social security than
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in its absence.

Therefore, the introduttion of social security reduces

inheritances received by type 1 consumers. These consumers in turn
leave ameller bequests in the presence of social security than in its
the

absence,

Indeed,

in the new steady state the accidental bequest left by

each type j consumer is reduced by the introduction of social security.
Therefore, the introduction of social security reduces the inheritances
received

by

inheritance

all consumers

(except for type 0 consumers

in either case).

who

receive no

Because the only source of cross-sectional

variation is the intra-cohort variation in inheritances, it follows that
fully funded social security narrows the steady state distributions of
consumption and wealth.6 In addition to reducing the intra-cohort
variation in wealth, the introduction of fully funded social security
affects the average level of wealth in the economy and the size of the
national capital stock,

K,

The national capital stock (per young person),

is equal to the sum of the private capital stock, W*, and the capital

held by

the social security system, T.

Recalling from (12) that the

private capitol atock is proportional to

and recalling that the

introduction of social security reduces the value of

WW),

it follows

that the introduction of social security reduces the private capital
stock,

Moreover, it can be shown that the reduction in the private

capital stock, W*, is greater than T.
stock, K*

W* +

T,

Therefore, the national capital

declines in response to the introduction of social

security.
The effect of social security on the average level of consumption
Chu [7] extends this model to make the rate of return on capital and
labor income endogenous. He further modifies the model to make social
the
security taxes proportional to labor income and shows that linking
social security tax to income leads to different results about the
distribution of wealth.
6

13

can be calculated using the national income identity. To derive this
identity, let Nt denote the number of young consumers born in period
The assumption that each consumer has G children implies that Nt —

t.

GNi.

Cross national product in period t is equal to the labor income of young
consumers, NtY, plus gross capital income, R ?ç1(W*±T).7 Cross national
product is allocated to consumption and saving.

Total consumption is

equal-to the consumption of the young consumers, Ntc*, plus the
consumption of the surviving old consumers,

(lp)N1x*.

saving is equal to the saving of the young consumers,
gross saving of the social security system,

N,,T

Gross national
pius the

Equating the sources

and uses of gross national product yields
NtY

+

R Nt 1(W*+T)

—

Nc* +

(l-p)N 1x* + N(W*+T)

(16)

Equation (16) simply tate5 that gross national product is equal to
consumption plus gross investment.
recalling that Nt/Nti

C

c*

+

The

left hand side of

(l-p)/C3

W* +

and K*

y

x*

(l7

Dividing both sides of (16) by Nt and

+

[R/C

T yields
-

13 K*

(17y

is aggregate consumption per capita.

The definitions of gross national product, gross capital income, gross
national saving and gross investment used here differ somewhat from those
dsed in the national income accounts. Recall that one unit of capital in
period t yields R units of the consumption good in period t+l. Using
more standard terminology, R is equal to 1 - d ÷ r where d is the rate of
depreciation and r is the rate of return on capital before subtratting
depreciation, With this notation, gross national product in period t is
+ rN 1(W* + T); gross capital income is rNti(W*+T); gross
investment, which is net investment plus depreciation, is
N(W*+T)
Nrl(w*+T) tl(w*+T); gross saving of the young generation is
and gross saving of the old generation, which is net saving plus
In the special case of
depreciation, is (lp)Ntix* + d(l-p)N51W*,
1 and therefore R
r.
In this case, gross
complete depreciation, d
national product is NtY +
+ T); gross capital income is
ti(T*+T) gross investment is Nt(W*+T); gross saving of the young
generation is NtW*; and gross saving of the old generation is zero, Thus
in the case of complete depreciation, the concepts of the gross nationai
product, gross capital income, gross national saving and gross investment
used in the text correspond to the standard national income accounting
definitions.
7

tl(W*
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Recall that the introduction of fully funded social security leads to a
reduction in the national capital stock, K*, on the right hand side of
If the rate of interest exceeds the population growth rate,

(17).

R/G

-

I

rhen

is positive and the reduction in K* implies a reduction in
Alternatively, if the interest rate is less chan

consumption per capita.

the population growth rate, then R/G

I is negative and the reduction in

the national capital stock K* implies an increase in consumption per
capita.
The relation between aggregate consumption and the aggregate
capital stock in (17) is related to Phelps's
result.

famous Golden Rule

1,23)

In order to maintain a constant level of capital per capita, it

is necessary that the capital stock grow at the same rate that population
grows.

Thus, if the level of capital per capita is to be increased

in each
permsnently by one unit, then the level of gross investment
period must be increased by C units per capita.

The benefit of

increasing the capital stock by one unit per capita is that gross capital
income is increased by

R

units per capita.

If R is greater than C, then

the increased capital stock will increase steady state consumption;
whether the economy should temporarily decrease consumption in order to
accumulate capital and increase long-run consumption depends on society's
preferences for present consumption relative to future consumption.
Alternatively, if

R

is less than C, then steady state consumption can be

increased by a decrease in the capital stock.

There is no tradeoff

between current and future consumption in this case.

An increase in

current consumption will reduce the capital stock and increase future
consumption.

Clearly, if an economy is ever in the case with

R

< C, it

should decrease its capital stock; this would increase consumption at all
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dates, which would be Pareto-improving.8
The case in which R is equal to G receives special attention.

In a

model with a neoclassical production function, the rate of return on
capital, R, is a strictly decreasing function of the capital stock;
hence, there is a unique value of the capital stock for which

R

— C.

This value of the capital stock is called the Golden Rule capital stock
The

lden

Rule capital stock is the capital stock that maximizes the

permanently sustainable level of consumption.

Any capital stock greater

than the Golden Rule capital stock is too large in the sense described
above, because R would be less than C.
Pay-as-you-go Social Securitii

A pay-as-you-go social security

system differs from a fully funded system in that the social security
system does not hold any capital under a pay-as-you-go system, the taxes
collected from the young consumers are used to pay the benefits to the
old consumers in the same period.

In each period,

G/(l-p) times as large as the su1iving old cohort.

the young cohort is
Therefore, setting

total tax collections from yoing consumers equal to the total benefits
paid to the old consumers yields the following relation between the
social security parameters S and T
GT
The

—

(l-p)S

consumption

substituting

(18)
-

(18)

of young type

0 consumers is calculated by

into (6) to obtain
aY +

al

-

(l-p)R/G]

(S/R)

(19)

Equation (19) indicates that the consumption of young type 0
consumers may either increase or decrease with the introduction of payas-you-go social security, depending on whether G exceeds or falls short
See Diamond {9] for a demonstration that a competitive economy may end
up with an inefficient overaccumulation of capital.
8
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of (l-p)R.

This result is to be contrasted with the finding that fully

funded social security unambiguously increases

c°

To understand this

difference, one can view the social security tax T as the price paid for
a contingent claim that pays S if the consumer lives for two periods.
The gross rate of return on this claim is S/T.

If this gross rate of

return, S/T, exceeds the rste of return available on the consumer's
portfelio, R, then the introduction of social security will effectively
make the consumer richer and will increase consumption.

However, if the

rate of return on social security falls short of the rate of return on
the consumer's portfolio, then the introduction of social security will

reduce the consumption of young type 0 consumers.

Now obsene from (13)

that the rate of return on fully funded social security, S/T, is equal to
R/(l-p) which exceeds R if p > 0.
leads to an increase in

Thus, fully funded social security

Alternatively, (18) implies that the rate

of return on pay-as-you-go social security, S/T, is equal to G/(l-p)
which may be greater than, less then, or equal to R.

Therefore, pay-as-

you-go social security may lead to en increase, decrease, or no change in

Although the introduction of pay-as-you-go social security may
either raise or lower (0), inspection of (7) reveals immediately that it

w(0)
unambiguouly reduces the saving of young type 0 consumers,
fully funded social security, the reduction in
inheritance received by each type j consumer

(j

As with

implies that the
> 0) is reduced.

Again,

the reduction in all nonzero inheritances implies that the crosssectionel variation in wealth is reduced.

Also, the reduction in

agein implies that the per capita value of private weelth, W*, is reduced
by the introduction of social security.

Under pay-es-you-go social
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security, the government does not hold any capital; the national capital
stock is equal to the private capital stock.

Because pay-as-you-go

social security reduces the private capital stock, W*, it also reduces
the national capital stock.

Again (17) indicates that consumption per

capita will fall if the interest rate, R, exceeds the population growth
rate, G, but will increase if R is less than C.
-B.

Annuities

The model presented above has yielded some important insights about

the behavior of individual and aggregate saving, and about the effects of
social insurance, in the presence of uncertain individual longevity.
However, the model has at least two unsatisfactory implications.

First,

because consumers are assumed to be selfish, they would choose to hold
all of their wealth in annuities, even if the annuities were not

actuarially fair.

Provided that an annuity pays a greater return than

riskless capital in the event the consumer survives, the consumer would
choose to fully snnuitize his or her wealth.

Thus, there is an incipient

demand for annuities, and a satifactory treatment would either include
annuities or would provide an economic reason why there are no annuities
in equilibrium.

The model presented above simply rules out annuities by

assumption. However, annuities will be introduced into the analysis
below.
The second unsatisfactory feature of the model is that the children
of the richest consumers are among the poorest members of the economy if
their rich, but selfish, parents live for two periods and thus leave no
bequest.

In this model, the only channel for the preservation of

a

family's wealth across generations is through accidental bequests which
occur with early death.

This feature of the model can be eliminated by
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introducing a bequest motive,

In order to be able to focus first on the

implications of an annuity market, the introduction of the bequest motive
will be delayed until section C.
Now suppose that there is a competitive market for annuities.9
Each dollar invested by a young consumer in an annuity yields Q dollars
in the following period if the consumer

auives;

the consumer's estate

recaivea nothing if the consumer dies after only one period of life.
Insurance companies sell these annuities end invest the proceeds in
riakless capital which pays a gross rate of return R.

In the following

period, insurance companies distribute the premiums with accrued interest
to the aurliving annuitanta in proportion to their contributions when
The gross rate of return earned by aurvivora is equal to R/(l-p).

young.

The introduction of a competitive annuity market into the model
dramatically alters the nature of the equilibrium and the effects of
social security.

Because R/(l-p) exceeds R, annuities dominate riskleaa

capital and all consumers would choose to hold all of their wealth in the
form of annuities. Therefore there would he no bequests--accidental or
otherwiae,

Hence, there would be no cross-sectional variation in wealth.

In this situation, it is appropriate to uae a "representative consumer"
model,
In the presence of an annuity market offering a gross rate of
return Q, the consumption of a representative old consumer, x. is
x

QW+S

Q[Y-T-c]+S

(20)

The optimal level of consumption when young can be calculated by
9 Kotlikoff and Spivak [20] discuss the role of the family in helping to
provide annuities. The annuity protection offered by family members is
not, of course, as complete as the insurance available in competitive
annuity markets, Nevertheless, this annuity protection does affect
consumer behavior.
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substituting the lifetime budget constraint (20) into the utility
function (3) and then differentiating the resulting expression with
respect to c.

a [Y

c

where,

Setting this derivative equal to zero yields

as earlier,

l/[l+(l-p)DJ.

coner

-

T + S/QJ

the marginal propensity to consume, a, is equal to

Equation (21) states that the consumption of a young

is proportional to the present value of lifetime resources

where the

future

social security benefit, S, is discounted by the

actuarial rate of return Q.
competitive annuity market Q

can

(21)

Alternatively,

recalling that in a

R/(1-p), the consumption

function in (21)

be written as
c

a [Y

-

T

+

(l-p)S/R1

(22)

The consumption function in (22) indicates that in the presence of

a

competitive annuity market, the appropriate concept of lifetime income

is the expected present value of income.

FNflded

Social Security:

Now consider the effects of

introducing a fully funded social security system as characterized by
(13).

Substituting the social security parameters from (13) into the

consumption function (22) yields
c

aY

(23)

Equation (23), which presents the optimal level of consumption of a
young consumer in the presence of a fully funded social security system,
displays a remarkable result.

This equation indicates that the optimal

level of c is independent of the values of the social security parameters
T and S.

Thus, the optimal level of c is invariant to the introduction

of fully funded social security.
The reason for the irrelevance of social security in the presence
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of a competitive annuity market is that fully funded social security
simply provides consumers with a redundant asset.

As stated earlier, a

consumer's claim to the social security benefit S can be viewed as an
asset with a gross race of return equal to S/T.

Under fully funded

social security, this rate of return is equal to R/(l-p), which is
precisely equal to the rate of return on privately available annuities.
Thux, zhile the social security system essentially forces young consumers

purchase an annuity. the consumers cen exactly offset this effect by
reducing their holdings of neivate annuities by an equal amount, Because
to

the

payoff characteristics of the private annuity are identical to those

of social security, the consumer can obtsin exactly the same stateof social
contingent stream of consumption after the introduction
security that could be obtained before its introduction.

Furthermore, it

will be optimal for the consumer to offset the effect of social security,
beceuse the initial state-contingent consumption plan was optimal.

Since

the introduction of fully funded social security doee not change any
relative price and does not change the consumer's opportunity set in any
way, the original optimal plan remains optimal.
The irrelevance of fully funded social security in the presence of
a competitive annuity market is an example of a more general phenomenon

that is

knom

as the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem.

Briefly, the

Ricardimn Equivalence Theorem states that chsnges in the timing of lumpsum taxes, holding constant the path of government spending, have no
effect on the allocation of consumption.

The reason is essentially that

consumers can, and will, offset the effects of such changes by adjusting
their savings and/or bequest behavior.
As shown above, the Ricardien Equivalence Theorem applies to fully
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funded social security in the presence of an actuarially fair private
annuity market.

However, there are at least two sources of departure

from the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem in the case of fully funded social
security.

First, it should be noted the invariance of consumption to the

introduction of fully funded socical security is a direct consequence of
the fact that the rate of return on social security is exactly the same

as the rate of return on private annuities,

If, for some reason,

the

rates of return on private annuites and social security were not
identical, then the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would not hold.

example,

For

if the rate of return on social security exceeded the rate of

return on private annuities, then the introduction of social security
would increase the expected present value of lifetime income and would
iead to an increase in the consumption of young

consumers°

Of course,

the question then arises as to why the government would be able to offer

a higher rate of return on annuities than the private sector could.

It

would appear to be difficult the make the case that the government is
more efficient in providing annuities, and it would also appear to be
difficult to make the opposite case, a priori.
explanation, which is discussed below,

s

An alternative

that if consumers face

different mortality risks, and have private information about these
risks, then the private annuity market would be subject to adverse
selection.

However, the government could, by requiring a compulsory

level of social security coverage, be immune to adverse selection and
thus offer a higher rate of return.

A

second reason why the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem may not hold

10 Karni and Zilcha {l7} examine the effect of social security in the
presence of unfair annuity and life insurance markets in a model that
includes a bequest motive.
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is that if the social security tax is large enough,
he

abe

ta:o

to offset it ccmpletely.

the consumer

ncr

Equivalently, a large social secucity

prov dad

nay fcrcc the censumer to hold mcre of the publicly

Ic

.rev

annuity

held of he private annuity. Thcrefcce, tue
ccnsuner .ccul-' not be able to offset completely the effect of the
than

o" she wculd ha-ir

publicly provided nnrvitv by reducing private annuity holdings; 'he
conrvmer we cimply rot 'lsnning to hold that much wealth in private
annuities, Formafly th:a argument can be stated by obaervinf that rho
Y
'I - c, in view of the
private raring of e -csog cenauzser

eptinel level of ccnc'u"yicn rn (23; the optimal level of pcsvst
of e young consuma' le
W

Provided that

(I-c)
T

T

Y

is less

caving

(24)

than (l-a)Y, the consumer could offset the

effecs of social seouriti

the h Lding of prirate ennuitiea
by P". However, if T is greeter than (I-a'?, then in crdcr tr irsirtain
a
vould baum to
the otigit.mlly planned fl- ci of ronsunpti',r. ch.
held

a negative amo" -r

could be achieumd

if he or

debt
The

abe

ii

by reducing

of annuities

the

crnummer

A

nsps7:

/

/

ding

of ennuitier

could butrum tesources and repay the

survives but have the debt cancelled

if he

actuarially fair rste of return on such loans would be Q

The Ricardian Ec,uivalence Theorem would helu

at the aetua.isl'y faIr rate

Q.

However,

if

or abe dies.

R/(l-p).

if

the consumer could borrow
the consumer were unable to

the social security benefit is legally prohibited
-TAsterml'
then the Ricardisn Equivalance Theorem would

borrow (perhaps because
from

serving as

fall

to hold if P is greater than (1-a)?.

would

In this case,

reduce the consumption of young consumera.

social security
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Pay-as-yougo

Social Security Although a fully funded social

security system is ineffectual in the presence of a competitive annuity
market, this is not true, in general, for a pay-as-you-go system.

To

determine the optimal level of consumption under pay-as-you-go social
security, substitute the social security parameters from (18) into the
consumption function (22) to obtain

a Y + a [G/R

—
If

the

-

I]

T

(25)

rate of interest exceeds the population growth rate,

then

C/R - 1 is negative and the introduction of social security leads to a
reduction in consumption of young consumers,
reduction is quite clear.

The reason for this

The rate of return on pay-as-you-go social

security, S/T, is equal to G/(l-p) and the rate of return on private
annuities is R/(l-p).
forces

security
return

than

Thus, if R

>

G, then the introduction

young consumers to hold

annuities

is available in the private market.

with

of social

a lower

rate

of

Therefore, consumers are

made poorer by the introduction of social security and they reduce their
consumption.
If the rate of interest is less than the population growth rate,
then G/R

-

1

is positive and the introduction of social security

increases consumption.

Furthermore, the introduction of social security

is Pareto-improving in this case.

In the period in which pay-as-you-go

social security is introduced, the members of the old generation are
clearly better off because they receive the social security benefit S
without ever having had to pay social security taxes.

In addition, each

subsequent generation is made better off by the introduction of social
security because it provides them with an annuity that dominates the
11 See Hubbard and Judd l6] for a more complete discussion of the
effects of social security in the presence of borrowing constraints.

24

annuity available in the private market.

The fact that the introducticn

of social security is ParetoJmprovingindicates that the initial
Indeed, the Golden Rule results

equilibrium was not Psretoefficient.
discussed above indicate that if
positive, then-

of capital.

R

< C, and if the capital stock ia

the economy suffers from an inefficient overattuisulation

As applied to pay-asyou-go social security when

Coldga Rule result indicates that any increase in T and
improving

until private saving

by young consumers

with a neoclassical production function, until

R

R

< C, the

S is Pareto-

is driven to zero (or,
is equal to C).

Beruestotive
me preceding analysis introduced annuities but hss the shortcoming
that there are no bequests in the model. As a consequence, the
distribution of wealth is degenerate.

In order to generste bequests in a

model with a competitive annuity market, a bequest motive is introduced
The two most common formulations of the bequest motive

in this section,

are altruism and the joy-of-giving.

Although these specifications are

similar in many respects, they have different implications for the
validity of the Ricardisn Equivalence Theorem and the efficscy of fiscal
policy.
Altruism:

The altruistic specification of the bequest motive

became popular in macroeconomics after Eerro's [4) presentation of the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem.
bequest motive,

a

Under an altruistic specification of the

consumer obtains utility from the utility of his heirs

as well as from his own consumption.

Consider a consumer born in period

t who consumes c0 in period t and, contingent on survival, consumes

in period t+l.

Let Vt denote the total utility of this consumer and let

is
Vt+l denote the total utility of his or her representative heir, who
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born in period t+i.
in

Vt
where EtC
t.

)

Suppose that the consumer's utility function is

c + (i-p)D

in

+

Et(Vt+i}

(26)

denotes the expectation conditional on information in period

The parameter

,

which is assumed to lie between zero and one,

measures the strength of the altruistic bequest motive.
The utility of an altruistic consumer depends on his or her
chiJdren's utility, which in turn depends on their children's utility,
and so on.

Thus, the utility of

a

consumer depends on the entire stream

lifetime

and over the lifetimes of

of consumption over his or her

own

all of his or her descendents,

Formally, the recursive specification of

altruistic preferences in (26) is a linear difference equation that is
satisfied by the following infinite-horizon utility function12
Vt

zE0(3rln
1—0

c+

+

(i-p)Dln

xc÷i+j)}

(27)

Now consider the effects of social security in the presence of an
altruistic bequest motive,

it is easiest to begin with the case in which

all consumers live for two periods with certainty (formally p
First,

0).

consider a fully funded social security system in which RT

S.

As in the case without a bequest motive, fully funded social security
will have absolutely no effect.

In response to the introduction of fully

funded social security, young consumers will maintain their original
levels of consumption and will simply reduce their private saving by F.
in the following period, when they are old, their portfolios of private
assets will be worth RT less than in the absence of social security, but
they will receive a social security benefit of S — RT that allows them to
Douglas Gale [13, pp. 55-61] has emphasized that equation (27) is
only one of an infinity of solutions to the difference equation in (26).
However, (27) is the specification that is generally used in the
literature.
12
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maintain the original level of old-age consumption.
which

Now

consider the introduction of psy-as-you-go social security in

S

CT.

Under altruistic preferences, it turns out chat this

policy also has no effect.

The old consumers who are alive in the period

in which social security is introduced will receive a payment of S but
they will not increase their consumption at all.

Instead, they will
This

chogse to increase their bequest to each of their heirs by S/C.

increased inheritance exactly offsets the tax burden T levied on each of
the young consumers,

Thus, all young and old consumers are able to

the original levels of consumption. Because all relative prices
and marginal rates of substitution remain unchanged, there is no
maintain

incentive for anyone to change consumption.
The discussion above demonstrates that in the absence of longevity
risk and with altruistic preferences, the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
holds

both for fully funded social security and for pay-as-you-go social

security.

That is. private consumption is invsriantto the introduction

of social security whether it is fully funded or pay-as-you-go.

When

longevity risk is re-introduced into the model, the Ricardian Equivalence
Theorem

fully

does

not hold quite so generally.

funded social security.

It

doer continue to hold for

Because the rate of return on fully funded

social security, S/T, is equal to the rate of return on private
annuities. R/(l-p). young consumers respond to the introduction of social
security by reducing their holding of private annuities by T;

they

maintain their consumption unchanged.
The effects of pay-as-you-go social security in the presence of
longevity risk and altruistic preferences are more interesting.
the period in which the pay-as-you-go social security system is

Consider
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All surviving old consumers receive a social security

introduced,
benefit S

* GT/(l-p).

However, because a fraction 1-p of families have a

do
surviving old consumer and the remaining fraction p of the families
not have a surviving old consumer, this payment

to

surviving old

consumers induces a redistribution of wealth across families.

In

there is a redistribution from families without a surviving
old &nsumer to families with a surviving old consumer Each surviving
old consumer will see that the present value of his or her family's
resources is increased by the introduction of social security.

particular,

Therefore,

surviving old consumers will increase their own consumption

somewhat and will also increase their bequests somewhat in order to share
.he increase in wealth with subsequent generations.

By contrast, the

in families without survivors will see

young

consumers

their

families' wealth and they will reduce their own

a

decrease in

consumption

and

their bequests.
The argument above indicates that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem
fails to apply to pay-as-you-go social security under longevity risk,
even if consumers have altruistic bequest motives.

However, a staunch

defender of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would not concede the case
so quickly.
that

the

market.

A defense of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem would argue

insurance
analysis in the paragraph above has ignored a relevant
(ore precisely, if the introduction of social security was at

least conceivable in the prior period,

then each young consumer would

have taken steps to guard against the risk of having social security
introduced during a period in which there were no surviving old consumers
in his or her family.

Each young consumer in the previous period would

have agreed to give up any social security benefit,

S,

received in the
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subsequent period in exobsnge for (l-p)S to be psid ro the consumer, or

his

estate, in the following period.

insurance
go

social

If this sort

of tax

liability

arrangeaont wets in foroe, then the introduction of pay-as-yousecurity would have no effeot on the allocation of privete

consumption.

Although

this argument is theoretically sound, it will

undoubtedly strike aany readers as far-fetched. This type of insurance
arrangement is

not typically observed in practice, either because of

legal prohibitions on trading future social security benefits or because
of the liaited ability and/or willingness of consumers to anticipoto and
write contracts for oIl conceivable contingencies.

2of-oivno: The

altruistic specification of

the bequest cotive

often implies that individual consumers will take actions to completely
nullify the effects of various lump-sum tax and transfer policies. An
alternative specification of the bequest motive is the joy-of-giving.
Under the joy-of-giving, consumers obtain utility from their own
consumption

and from leaving a bequest,

bequest depends only on the size of

The utility from leaving the

the bequest;

it does not depend on

utility or consumotion of the recipients of the hequest. An example
of a utility function that displays a joy-of-giving bequest motive is
the

In
where

c

(l-p)

U

In

x1 + pH(BD) + (l-p)H(88t)

(28)

is the bequest if the consumer dies sfter one period, and

is the bequest if the consumer survives for two periods.

specification in
11(b);

(28)

,

Under the

the utility from leaving a bequest of size h is

it is assumed that H'(h)

>

U

and 11(b)

<

0.

To analyze optimal consumption and portfolio behavior under the
utility function in (28), let At denote the amount of wealth that the
consumer holds in the form of annuities at the end of

period

t;

the
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remainder of the portfolio, I
riskless capital.

+

Y - T -

t

At, is held in the form of

If the consumer dies young, the bequest,

B,

is equal

to the value of riskless capital with accrued interest

D_

{I+Y-T-ct-A]R

(29a)

Alternatively, if the consumer survives for two periods, wealth in
the second period consists of the principal and interest on annuities as

well as on riskless capital;

Total available resources are allocated to

security benefit, S.
consumption,

BS

x1,
[I

÷

in addition, the consumer receives a social

and to the bequest,
-

r

-

c

AtR

+

so that
AtQ + S

-

x1

(29b)

The young consumer's consumption and portfolio decisions can be
solved by substituting (29a,b) into (28) and then differentiating with
respect to

c,

in Abel [2]

and A,.

The solution to this problem is presented

The discussion below focusses on a few interesting

implications of optimal behavior.
Optimal behavior implies that the consumer would be indifferent
between investing an additional dollar in riskless capital or in
annuities)-3

An additional dollar invested in annuities would be worth

Q dollars in the following period if the consumer survives.

This

additional wealth could be used to increase the bequest

B3 by

thereby increasing expected utility by (l-p)Q H'(B5t).

Alternatively, an

Q units,

13
If the consumer faces a binding constraint on the holding of
riskiess capital or annuities (such as a nonnegativity constraint), then
he would not in general be indifferent about whether to invest an
additional dollar in riskless bonds or in annuities. For this particular
optimization problem, the consumer will choose to hold positive amounts
of both riskiess bonds and annuities provided that H' (b) approaches
infinity as b approaches zero; thus, any nonnegativity constraints on the
holdings of capital or annuities would not be binding.

extra dollar invested in riskless
following

either

capital would be worth R dollars in the

period regardless of whether the consumerdies

case,

survives.

or

In

the consumer could increase the bequest by R dollars,

pRH'(S°)

thereby intreasing expected utility by (l-p)PJ{(B5t)

dollars.

Therefore, the consumer will be indifferent between investing the dollar
in riskless capital

-and

(l-p)Q H(BSt)

annuities if
(l-p)R H'(B5t) + pR FU(B0t)

(30)

Recall that if the annuities are actuarially fair,
In this case,

it follows directly fron (30) that

S°

=

then (l-p)Q

Btt,

P.

That is, in

the presence of actuarially- fair annuities, the consumer plans to leave
the same bequest whether he or she lives for one or two periods.

This

result depends on the fact that the marginal utility of a bequest does
not depend on whether the consumer lives for one period or for two
periods.
on

In particular, the joy-of-giving function

11(b)

does not depend

whether the consumer lives for one period or two periods. (The sane

result also holds under an altruistic bequest motive.) The intuition
behind this result is that actuarially fair annuities permit the consumer
to completely insure the consumption basket which consists of c,
The strategy to achieve full insurance is implemented by
B°t, and
holding just enough riskless capital to provide for the desired bequest
and

just

social

enough

annuities (including the contingent claim

on

the future

security benefit 5) to provide for second-period consumption.4
The introduction of a fully funded social security system has no

effect under a joy-of-giving bequest motive.

The reason, as in the

absence of a bequest motive, and as in the presence of an altruistic

14

See Sheshinski and Weiss [241.
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bequest motive, is that the annuity provided by the social security
system offers exactly the same payoffs as the privately available
annuity.

Therefore, consumers can, and will, choose to fully offset the

effects of social security.
The effects of pay-as-you-go social security under the joy-ofgiving bequest motive differ quite dramatically from the effects under
a1truism.

The difference is most clear in the case in which all

consumers live for two periods with certainty

(p'-O).

Recall that under

altruism, when the pay-as-you-go social security system is introduced,
old consumers simply bequeath the payment, S, to their children in order
to compensate them for their increased tax of S/C per capita.

However.

under the joy-of-giving bequest motive, it would nbc be optimal for old
consumers to maintain their consumption unchanged while increasing their
bequests by S.

The reason is that the utility from leaving a bequest

depends only on the size of the bequest and not on the utility or
consumption of the heirs.

Thus,

in response to receiving the payment S.

old consumers would increase both their consumption and the bequest they
leave.

Essentially, consumption and bequests are both goods that enter

the consumer's utility function, and, furthermore, these are the only
arguments of the utility function.

Consumption and bequests are each

specified to be normal goods in (28) so that in response to an increase
in income, the consumer optimally increases consumption of both of these
goods.
The analysis in the paragraph above indicates that for the purpose
of analyzing the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, it is extremely important
whether the bequest motive is of the altruistic or joy-of-giving variety,
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The reason is that under altruistic preferences the consumer cares about
the entire stream of his or her family's consumption.

Because the

consumer does not care about the size of bequests per se, he or she is
indifferent among changes in bequest patterns that maintain the initial
Bllocation of consumption.

Thus,

in response to certain lump-sum tax and

transfer policies, the consumer maintains the original path of
consamption simply by rearranging bequests.

However, under the joy-of-

giving bequest motive, the consumer cares directly about the level of
lequests, and therefore does not find it optimal to rearrange bequests
while keeping consumption unchanged.

eteroeneousMortalit-Probabilities
Up to
identical

this point

mortality

it has been

assumed that all consumers face

probabilities cx ante.

However, if consumers have

different probabilities of survival, then there are additional channels
through which fiscal policy may operate.

in addition, heterogeneity of

cx ante mortality probabilities raises the possibility of adverse
selection in the

private

annuity market, which has iaportant consequences

for the pricing of annuities and for the efficacy of fiscal policy.
The implications of heterogeneous ex ante mortality probabilities
are clearest in the absence of a bequest motive so the discussion below
will be confined to this

caseJ5

in the absence of bequest motive, and

in the presence of private annuities, all consumers will choose to hold
their wealth entirely in annuities and hence there will be no bequests or
inheritances.

The major strategic decision in developing a model with

15 The effects of fiscal policy under heterogeneous mortality
probabilites and a joy-of giving bequest motive are examined in Abel [2]
and [3],
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heterogeneous mortality probabilities is whether to assume that an
individual consumer's probability of dying, p, is known only by that
consumer or whether it is a publicly available bit of information.

The

discussion below begins with the assumption that each consumer's value of
p is known by insurance companies. Next,

the discussion will turn to the

case in which the value of an individual's mortality probability is
priv,ae information,

These two cases are based on Abel

and [fl,

respectively,
Public Knowledge of Mortality Probabilities:

Suppose that the ex

ante mortality probability of each consumer is known to everyone,
including insurance companies.

Under this assumption, of course,

competitive insurance companies will offer annuities with different rates
of return to consumers with different values of p.

Annuities will be

priced to be actuarially fair to each consumer so that
probability

a

consumer with a

p

of dying young can buy annuities that offer a rate of

—

R/(l-p)

return
(31)

If follows immediately from (31) that consumers with a high
probability of dying young will be able to purchase annuities with a high
rate of return.

Equivalently, these consumers can buy a given contingent

payoff in the second period more cheaply than could healthier consumers
who have a lower value of p.
annuities,

(l)Q1

However, the expected rate of return on

is identical for all consumers and is equal to R.

Suppose that all consumers have logarithmic preferences as
specified in (3).

Let c(p) denote the consumption of a young consumer
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probability of dying young is equal to
from the consumption funotion in (21) that

whose

a(p) fT - T

c(p)

where

a(p)

1/fl

+

(l-p)D].

p

It

follows immediately
(32)

(l-p)S/R]

Observe that the marginal propensity to

consume, a(p), is an increasing function of p.

Thus, if S

T

0, then

funotion of p.
consumption of young consumers would be an intreasing

The

is that with logarithmit preferences and no aetond-period incote,

reawn

return on savings.
consumption when young is independent of the rate of
Thus

the fact that consumers with a higher value of p ran obtain

annuities

with

a

higher rate

of return is irrelevant for the tonsunption

However, because consumers

decision,

with a high

p

have a small chance

of enjoying consumption in the second period, they will consume more when
of p,
they are young. This result, that c(p) is an increasing function
holds

also for positive S and T, prowided that the values of these tax

parameters are omall,
lly

FHped2oujS&L&sHr,itfl

Now

consider the effects of a

funded social security system that ignores differences

mortality

probabilities

in cx

fully

ante

The assumption is not that the government is

unable to observe ax ante mortality probabilities that are ohservsblo by
insurance companies;

rather, the assumption is that, for some reason,

the social security system does not discriminate according to mortality
probabilities

Under a fully funded social security system, the benefits

and taxes satisfy
(l-p*)S

RT

(33)

where p* is the avetage of the cx ante mortality probabilities of yourg
tonsuzsers.

into
substituting the social security parameters from /33)

the consumption function

—

c(p)

than

yields
(34)

(p*p)T/(l-p*))

that the consumption of young consumers with a

the
average probability of dyirg (p > p*) is reduced by

of social security the consumption of young conumers witn

intr&uction

a

fT

from (34)

Observe
higher

a(p)

32)

loser than average pronshilitv of dyicg is increased by the

introduction

of social securirt

These

effects

on consumptior

reflect

the fact that non-discrirsinacoty sociai security redistributes income
from consumers with a high value of p to consumers with a low value of p
The

social security system forcer consumerb to hold an annuity with gross

rate

of return SIT

R/(l-p*)

For consumers with p >

p,

this rate of

return is 1e55 than the rate ci returc availaole on private annuities and
thus these consumers are made poorer by the irtroduction of sons1

contrast for crrsumers with p < p, the annuity prov1dcby social security offers a higher rate of rerun. char is otherwise
available to them. Hence these consumers are made wealthier and increase
security.

By

their consumptior
The introduction of social security shift resources, and hence
toward consumers
consumption, away from consumers with a high varue of p
with a low value of p

Because consumers with

high value of p

censumera with a low
initially had high consumption relative to

vlue

of

the cross-sectional variation
p, this redistribution of resources reduces
in consumption.

Note that the mechanism for reducing cross-sectionaL

variation differs from the mechanism in the csse without annuities and
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with accidental bequests.

In that case, the source of cross-sectional

variation was accidental bequests;

by reducing savings, social security

reduced accidental bequests and cross-sectional variation,
present model, there are no bequests.

In the

The source of variation, in the

absence of social security, is the difference in marginal propensities to
consume which results from different mortality probabilities.

In

addition to reducing cross-sectional variation in consumption,

the introduction of fully funded social security reduces the aversge

fe1of consumption of
consumption
from

young consumers.

This reduction in average

arises because the social security aysten transfers resourres

consumers with a high marginal prooensity

consume

(high

p

marginal propensity to consume (low p
consumers), This result can be derived formally by defining t(Z(p) as
consumers)

to consumers with a

to

low

the population average value of some arbitrary function Z(p).16 With

this dafinirion. the average consumption of

young ronsumers

is E(c(p)

where

E(c(p))

it

E(a(pflY

E((p*p)a(pflT/(lp*)

can be shown formally that ENp*.p)a(p))

intuitively, the reason is that E((p*p)a(p))
5

Cov(p*p,a(p)).

(35)

is negative.

is equal to E(p*-p)E(a(pfl

Because E(p*.p) is, by definition, equal to zero,

follows that E((p*p)a(p))

is equal to Cov(p*p,a(pfl.

it

Since pt-p is

16 At a formal level, let f(p) denote the density function of the cx
ante mortality probability p. With this definition, the average cx ante
probability p* is equal to
I
f0 Z(p)f(p)dp so that E(Z(pfl is the
J0 pf(p)dp. Now define E(Z(p))
value
of
average
Z(p).
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decreasing in p and a(p) is increasing in p, this covariance is negative.
Therefore,
E((p*p)a(p))

<

0

(36)

The inequality in (36) implies that the coefficient of T in (35) is
negative.

Therefore, as argued above, an increase in T leads to a

reduction in average consumption of young consumers

Private Information and Adverse Selection: Now suppose that there
is heterogeneity of cx ante mOrtalIty probabilicies
mortality probabilities are private information

and that indi:idual

More specifically,

suppose that each individual consumer knows nis or her own

e ante

value of
mortality probability, but that no one else knows that person's
p.

However, the distribution of cx ante morrvli:y probabilities in the

population is public knowledge.

This informa'ion structure gives rise to

a classic adverse selection problem

In the case of annuities, the high

risk consumers from the viewpont of insurance crspanies are those
consumers with a low mortality probability p.
demand more annuities tian the consumers with

These consumers will

hto

mortality

receive annuity
probabilities and they will be more likely to survive and
payments.
In general, the equilibrium in the presence of adverse selection is
either a pooling equilibrium

in which consumers do not reveal thear

private information, or a separating equilibrium in which the optimal
behavior of consumers reveals their private information

To simplify the

be
determination of the market equilibrium, an additional assumption will
made.

In particular, assume that an insurance company cannot determine

whether any given consumer has purchased annuities from other insurance
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companies.

The foroe of this assumption ia to rule out separating

aquilibria in which consumers with different mortality risks face
different rates of return on annuities. If insurance companiea tried to
charge higher prices (i.e., offer lower rates of return) to consumera
with low p, then these consumers would masquerade aa high

p

consumers and

would buy only a small amount of annuities at a given inaurance company.
Than these consumers would aatisfy their relatively large demand for
annuities by purchasing additional annuities from one or more other
companies,

Therefore, an insurance company's attempt to separate its

customers by offering different quantities of annuities at different
prices would fail.

Insteed, the market would be characterized by ooe

rate of return that is offered on all annuities.

Because of adverse

selection, this rate of return would have to be lower than R/(l-p*),
which is the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortslity.
In the absence of a bequest motive the demand for annuities by s

will be equal to the consumer's savings, which is equal to
firstperiod income, Y - T, minus consumption in the first period. Let
A(p;Q) denote the amount of annuity demanded by a young consumer with a
consumer

mortality probability

p when the rate of return on annuities is

C).

Using

the consumption function in (21), it follows that
A(p;Q)

[1-a(p)]

fY

-

-

TJ

a(p)S/Q

(37)

Equation (37) implies that in the absence of social security (S
0),

the demand for annuities is invariant to the rate of return they

offer,

This invariance is a consequence of the offsetting income and

substitution effects associated with logarithmic utility.
that a'(p)

>

0 which implies that 1

-

a(p)

T

Now recall

is a decreasing function of p.
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Thus, if Y

-

T

S/Q >

-

0, then the demand for annuities is a decreasing

function of p.
The equilibrium rare of return on annuities is such that the
expected profit of insurance companies is equal to zero,

Insurance

sold to
companies will, on average, earn positive profits on annuities
ronsumers with high values of p

bur

will, on average, suffer losses on

of p.
snnl4ities sold to consumers with low values
absence of socIal security

in tLe

More precisely

the expected profit on annuities sold to

consumer with nortality pcohabillty p is [a -

(l-p)Q}A(p;Q).

Let a

denote the expected pcofi uf 'be a-inuity industry averaging over all
consumers, and observe thst

E{R

iv

-

"l

(38)

p)Q[A(p;Q)

This expressior' rsn be rewcittsu using the fact that 1-p

(l-p5)

(p*-p) to obtain
a

(l-p*)QiEA'p'Q)

[P.

Observe that E(p*-p}
-

security, A(p;Q)

-

ENp*p)A(p'Q)}Q

0 and recall that,

s(p)Y

Thus,

(39)

in the absence of soccal

in the absence of sociat security

the expected profit of the annuity industry ten he rewritten as
[R

-

(lp*)Q'E1l-a'p)}

+ g((p*-p)a(pflQ

(40)

The two terms on tne caght hand side of (40) have a binple
interpretation.

The first term is the expected profit of the annuity

the same amount of
industry that would prevail if all consumers oucchssed

annuities regardless of their cx sate mortalities prubsbilities.
second term, which is negative according to equation (36)

The

represents toe

to adverse
expected losses inflicted on insurance companies due
selection.

Observe that each of the two terms on the tight bend side of

40
(40) is a decreasing function of Q.

Therefore,

the expected profit of

the annuity industry is strictly decreasing in the rate of return offered
on annuities,

In addition, note that if the rate of return on annuities

is actuarially fair based on the population average probability p*, i.e.

R/(lp*),

if Q

then the first term on the right hand side of (40) would

be equal to zero,
negative.

In this case, r/Y would equal E((p*p)a(p)}Q which is

Therefore, any rate of return on annuities greater than or

equal to R/(lp*) would lead to expected losses for the annuity industry
and could not an equilibrium.
The equilibrium rate of return of annuities must yield zero
axoected profits on annuities.

In this case, with logarithmic utility.

and in the absence of social security, this rate of return is unique.
Setting the axpected profit,

Q

A E(l-a(p)) /

Thllj Funded Social
;rtvoducing

tha

ir,

equal to zero in (38) yields

E((l-p)(la(p)))

Securim

(41)

Now consider the effects of

fully' funded social security.

Although

social security has

payoff characteristics of an annuity, there is an important

difference between social security and the annuities available in the
private market,

Because the social security system focces all young

consumers to "purchase" equal amounts of the annuity it provides, the
social security system is immune to adverse selection.

The rate of

return implicit in social security, S/T, is equal to R/(l-p*) as in (33).
To calculate the effect of social security on the national capital
stock, substitute the relation between the social security parameters S
and T in (33) into the annuity demand function (37) to obtain
A(p;Q)

-

[l-a(p)]Y

-

T

-

[F

-

(l-p*)Q][a(p)/(lp*)Q]T

(42)

Recall

mat

as a consequence of adverse selection, R

-

(lpw)Q

> 0.

Thetefore, equatcon (42) indicates ttat the introduction of fully funded
social security reduces the deaand for annuities by uore than T,
the private capital stock falls by more than T.

ifQwore

would decrease by precisely

hence,

The demand for annuitiec

equal to R/(l-p*).

However,

because social security provides an annuity with a larger payoff than is
available on private annuities, the introduction of social sectrity
expands the opportunity set of all consumers and hence induces all
consumers to increase their runs uctrion when souno,

This increae in

consumption means that the private capital stock falls by rora than T.
Therefore the national capital atock, whrch is equal to the private
capital stock plus T, suco declineat/
In order to determine effects or social terurity on the equilibrium

of return on private annuities first ralculate the change in the
structure of the demand for priucte annuities. Differentiating the
rate

annuity

demand function in (42) with respect

derivative at S

dA(p;Q)/dT15TQ

f

=

tol

and evaluating the

C, yields
1

+

R

-

'lp*)Qya(p)/(i-p*,Q}

(43)

The term in curly brackets on the right hand aide of (43) is an
increasing function of p.

rnerefore, consumers with a hign value of p

reduce their demand for annuIties by a greater umounc rust consumers with
a low value of p.

Since consumers with

a

high value ol p began with a

lower annuity demand than low p consumers, it is clear that the high p
consumers reduce their demand for annuitiea by a larger fraction than do
17 This reduction in the private capital stock depends on the abaence of
a bequeat motive, If there is a sufficiently strong joy-of-giving
bequest motive, then the national capital stock may increase in response
to the introduction of fully funded social security. See Abel [2].
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the low p consumers.
consumers

industry,

is

Hence

the share of annuities bought by high p

reduced, which reduces the expected profits of rhe annuity

in order to restore zero expected profits, it is necessary for

the rate of return on annuities to decline,

in concluding the discussion of armuity markets, it is useful to
examine the quantitative effect of adverse selection in private annuity
rarkeAs.

Friedman and Warshawaky ill] and Warshawaky [25[ have analyzed

prices and the mortality experiences of annuity purchasers in. the
United States. They found that annuity purchasers tend to live longer
than the a:ierage American as tabulated in the U.S. Life. Tables. To get a
aeaanre of how nuch longer annuity purchasers live, they calculate load
annuity

gross load factor is defined as the ratio of the price paid
for an annuity to the expected present value of the payments accruing to

factors -

The

the net load factor i.s equal to the gross load
faoto-z ?oinus one. These load factors are calculated under two different
assumptions about mortality: in one calculation, the mortality
an annuity purchaser;

p-rohab-iiities are taken from the U.S. Life Tables and in the other

calculation, the mortality probabilities are calibrated to match the
'oortelitv experience of annuity purchasers. Not surprisingly, they found
that the expected present value of payments using annuity purchasers'
mortality is greater than the expected present value of payments using
the L'S. Life Table.

Therefore, the load factor based on annuity

ourchasers' mortality is less than the load factor based on the U.S. Life
Table.

Very roughly, the average net load factor based on the

US. Life

Tahie was around 30 cents on the dollar; the average net load factor
based on the mortality of annuity purchasers was about 15 cents on the

dollar.

The difference

attributed

to adverse

in load factors,

salection8

15

cents on the

dollar

was

However, the extent to which the

difference in mortality probabilities was private information or public
information could not be determined from these studies.
Although the load factors reported in these studies are
substantial, they do not appear to be large enough to explain the

widepread shunning of annuity markets by private consumers, Friedman
and Warshawsky

ll]

attribute a

boat

pact of the reluctance of

consumers to buy annuities to a bsqieat motive, out unanswered questions
remain,

For example, to what 0x'tnt do corsumers nold bequeathaoie

wealth rather than level-payment annuities as a precaution against the
need to make very large medical expenditures?

Perhaps this risk of

catastrophic medical expenditure explains the fact that retired consumers
decumulate their wealth much yore alowy than predicted by the life-cycle
model.

Clearly more research iito these ciaks and consumers' reactions

to these risks is needed

ar:

The discos.Aon of tna effecto of fiscal policy in cne

presence of longevity risk has examined several different sets of
assumptions about bequest nocives, the type of fiscal policy and the
availability and pricing of snnuities Rather than summarise all of
these cases, a few of the major themes will be highlighted.

The insight

of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is that fiscal policy will affect
18 Moce precisely, Friedman and Warshswsky [11 examine data for the
period 1968-1983 and find load factors of 32-48 cents on the dollar using
the 1,1,8. Life Tables; they find load factors of 18-33 cents on the dollar
sfter allowing for adverse selection. Warshawsky [25 examines data from
the period 1919-1984 and finds load factors of 10-29 cents on the dollar
using the U.S. Life Tables. He attributes 8 to 16 cents on the dollar of
these load factors to adverse sslection.
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private economic activity only if it changes the opportunities available
to individuals,

Such changes in opportunities could take the form of

changes in relative prices

c-c

changes

in-

the present value of resources.

In applying the insight of the kicardian Equivalence Theorem to
social

security,

it is useful to think of social security as an annuity

because consumers pay someth-ing when they are young in exchange for

that they will receive only if they sunive, Clearly, if there
is no market in which consumers can buy annuities then the introduction
of social security changes consumers' opportunity sets by providing on
somgthing

the introduction of social security affect rho
roving decisions of consumers who receive no ir-herirantes, it also
reduces the itheritamces of those people who do receive them.
Alternatively, if there is a private market for annuities, then the
Introduction of social security will have an effect only if the annuity
sonuity.

Not only does

social secu.rity offers different terms than those offered by
rsvstery traded annuities. If consumers have identical mortality
probabilities and if the rate of return on private annuities is
provided

by

actoerially fair,

then fully funded social security offers the same rate

of roturn as private annuities and thus has no effect,

This invariance

of economic behavior to the introduction of fully funded social security
holds regardless of whether consumers have a bequest motive or not and
holds regardless of the form of the bequest motive,
There are several reasons why the rate of return on social security
may differ from the rate of return on private annuities.

First, pay-as-

you-go social security offers an expected rate of return equal to the
copulation growth rate rather than the rate of return on capital.

Thus,

in general, pay-as-you-go social security offers a different rate of
return from the rate of return in competitive annuity markets.

Second,

if consumers have different mortality probabilities and if individual
consumers possess private information about their own mortality
probabilities, then the private annuity market will be subject to adverse
selection which drives down the rate of return on annuities.

In this

case, -fully funded social security would offer a higner rate of return
than private annuities.

Third, even if each individual consumer's

mortality probability is publicly known, then socia security will Lava
an effect if the government decides not to discriminate on the basis of
mortality probabilities.
taxes and benefits to

a

In this case,

the government offers the same

consumers, but ic the

pr atS

market consumers

face different prices for a given level of second-period benefits.
Therefore, for at

leat

sorru

consumera

social secnrity will offer a

different rate of return ciun pcivte annuities.
It might seem that if

me

rate of return on cociat security is

different from the rate of return on pcivateiy araiab_e annuities, then
the introduction of social securit' aouid cave an effect on private
saving decisions.

This presumption is indeed true if consumers do not

have bequest motives or if they I-ave joy-of-giving bequest motives
However, if consumers have altruistic bequest motires, then it may be
that social security has no effect even though it offets a rate of return
that differs from che rate on any privately traded asset.
in the absence of longevity risk,

For instance,

fully-funded social securaty would have

no effect even though the rate of return on social security differs from
the rate of return on capital.

However, in the presence of longevity

46

risk,

the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem could fail to hold even under

altruism

III,

Income Risk

In the previous sections of this

paper,

the risks have been

confined to uncertainty about the length of an individual's lifetime.
The market for life insurance and annuities allows consumers to reduce
the affects of these risks and, as discussed above, the functioning of
these

markets has important implications for the effects of fiscal

toiicv. This section will ignore longevity risk and focus instead on me
risk associated with an individual's future labor income. Future labor
income is risky for two reasons, First, there is a chance that a
consumer

will not be able to work as a result of an accident or illness.

fecond, even if the consumer is able to work,
as

future income will

a result cf fluctuations in productivity or in the demand

oc ass or her

services, Because disability insurance is available to
reduce, or even eliminate, the first of these sources of income risk, the
discussion will

ignore this source of risk, focussing instead on the

second source of income risk.
At first glance,

it appears that there is no insurance available tc

reduce the risk associated with fluctutations in productivity or in
demand,

Although there is no active insurance market to reduce the

riskiness of a future income stream, the income tax system provides a
form of income insurance,

If the income tax rate is constant, say at

27%, then the government essentially shares 27% of the risks associated
with fluctuations in labor income.

Not only does the income tax provide
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risk reduction as would more conventional types of insurance, it is also
subject to the problem of moral hazard,
Curve have made clear,

as discussions of the Lsffer

More precisely, while the income tax provides

some insurance against fluctuations in labor income,
disincentive to

it also provides a

the Leffer Curve is based on the possibilsry that

wor,c;

a tax rate increase will reduce work effort to such am extent that intone

taxrevenue would decline.
of

In order to isolate the risk-reducIng effects

the income tax, and to fooss or precautionary saving the analysis

will be based

the sssumpt400. ma labor supply Is perfecci" mnelssrcc.
Therefore, future labor income "ili be treated as an exogenous scochesrir
variable from the vievpoint of cde individual consumer.
on

Consider a
exogenous income

consumer vhc lives for two periods and receives

y an

consumer pays total trace

'

in parmods I end 2, respectively.
r-

and

i-

The

periods I end 2, respectively.

The deterimination of the n.nsner s max brIl sill be discussed in more
detail

below

respectively.

Let
The

0/ 'C consumption in. periooe I and 2
sevng of young rvns'user Is y1 - 0 - '1
c1

and

For

simplicity, suppose that the net rate of return on caving :o equal to
zero. In this case, the consumer's second-period .onsamprion is equal tc
saving plus second-period income net of texes, y2
c2
Suppose

-

r2.

y1-C1-c1+y7-r5

(44)

that the consumer's uciilry function is

u(c1) + u(c2)
Now consider a young consumer's saving derision.

decision,

(45)
When making

this

the consumer knows the values of y1 and ml but knows only the

probability distributions of '2 and r2

At the optimal level of

4t

consumption, the consumer is indifferent between consuming an additionai
unit in period 1 and inoreasing savings by one unit.

If Cl is increased

by one unit,

u'(c1

then the consumer's utility increases by

Alternatively, if the oonsumer saves an additional unit,

consumption, 02,

period

utility by E{u'(o2))

increases

where

firgt-period information.

by

one

then seccnd

unit, which increases expected

E(} denotes the expectation conditional
The

optimal consumption decision

on'

is

odaratterized by

A

-

u'(ol)
E(u'(c2fl
CqflintvErJalence

(46)

tuppose, for the moment. that the utility function u(c)
uadratic: u(c)
case,

c2/2

i-s

+ ho, where the parameter b is positive.

10 this

the marginal utitility is linear in consumption
c

u' (c)
t-ubsti

+

b

tuting the marginal

(47)

utility function (47)

into the

iirst

order condition (46) yields

Eo2)

(48)

01

Equation (48), which displays Robert
theory

of consumption, indicates that

ronaumption

is

Hall's

[l5

the expectation

equal to current consumption.

famous random walk

of future

Equivalently, oonsumptioc-

follows a random walk, The reason is that, with concave
consumers attempt

utility,

to mitigate fluctuations in consumption over time,

response to an increase in

income,

in

a consumer increases both current

consumption and planned future consumption.

In the case with quadratic

utility and equal rates of interest and time preference (both are zero in
this particular case), it turns out the intreases in c1 and the expected
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Under a more general utility function,

value of c2 are exactly equal.

consumption does not follow a random walk exactly, but the marginal
utility of consumption does follow a random walk as in (46)
The optimal level of c1 under quadratic utility can be determined
condition
by substituting the budget constraint (44) into the first-order
(48) to obtain
c1

—

(l/2){y,

-

t1 + My2

-

t2))

(49)

The consumption function in (49) displays rUe permanent income/life
cycle theory of consumption.

It satea that conaumprion Ia a function of

the expected preaent value of lifetime income, net of taxes.

In this

of expected
parricular example, it is optimal to consume one half
lifetime income in the firat period

The consumption function in (49)

also illustrates the certainty equivalence principle. More generally,
the certainty equivalence principle applies to optimization problems with
a quadratic objective funcrion and linear constraints with additive

uncertainty.

It states that optimal decision :ules depend on the

on any u:r.er
expected values of random varablea, but do not depeno
momenta of the distributions of the random variablea.

In particular, the

variance of the random variables is irrelevant and may as well be assumed
to be zero.

to the
Equivalently, the optimal decision rule la identical

rule that would prevail if all random variables were equal to their
expected values with certainty.
induced by
Precautionary saving is defined as the additional saving
the introduction of uncertainty about future income.

Beoauae the

variance of future
conaumption function in (49) is independent of the
income, it is not useful for examining precautionary saving.

Although

bo
the quadratic

aversion,

utility function on which

optimal

increase

is

based

displays

risk

behavior does nct display precautionary saving.

in the variance of
y2-t2

consumer;

(P9)

however

reduces

An

the axpected utility of the

it does not change the consumer's behavior at all.

there were actuarially fair insurance against the risks associated
with second-period income, the consumer would buy it. However, the
If

consumer

would choose the same level of 01 regardless of whether or rot

such insurance is available, In terms of the specification of the

function, risk aversion requires a positive second derivative,
hut precautionary saving reouires a positive third derivative, 19 The
cuadratic utility function, of course, has a positive seccnd derivative
but s zero third derivative,
utility

ut

Now

ionar'

consider a

a';in

utility function with a positive third derivative so

tOot the optimal consumption function will display; precautionary saving.

simplicity, suppose that the utility function is u(c) -exp{kc]
stare k > 0 is th,e coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 20 The isarginel
Tot

utility function is
k
u'(c)

exp[-kc]

(50)

Substituting the utility function from (50) into the first-order
condition (46), and using the budget constraint (44) to eliminate 02,
vie Ids
exp[-kc,]

E(expc-k(y1

-

+ p2 -

t.

-

c,)])

(51)

19 For an excellent discussion of the relation between risk aversion end
precautionary saving, see Kimball [18).
20 Kimball and Hankiw [19) examine the precautionary saving of an
infinite-horizon consumer with a constant absolute risk aversion utility
function, They use their model to examine the interaction of tax policy
and precautionary saving in a
dynamic framework.

richer

To calculate the expectation on the right hand side of (51)
distribution of the random variable y2
-

that y2
-

var(y2

t2}.

exp-k(y2

-

must be specified. Suppose

-

is normally distributed with mean

t2

the

Ey2

-

and variance

t2)

Under this distributional assumption, the expectation of
is equal to exp[kE(y2-t2+(l/2)k2Var{Y2t2H and

t2))

equation (51) can be rearranged to yield
-c1

[y1

t

-

+ E{y2

-

t2) - (l/2)k var(y2-t2)/2

(52)

The consumption function in (52) displays precautionary saving.
Consumption in the first period

s a linear and decreasing function of

Therefore, saving is a

the variance of second-period after-tax income.

linear and increasing function of the variance of future after-tax
income.
C.

Fiscal Policy

The simple consumption function in (52), which displays
precautionary saving, can be used to examine the interaction of
In particular, this

precautionary saving and various tax policies.

framework can be easily used to examine the impact of both 5mp-aum taxes
and income taxes.

for a
Many of the results presented below were derived

more general utility function by Louis Chan

6I

In this particular

model, as in Chan's model, income is exogenous so that the incentive
effects of taxes on labor effort will be ignored.

By treating income as

the income
exogenous, this model focusses on the insurance aspects of
tax,

Suppose that the second-period tax consists of a head tax,
a proportional income tax, at rate r

t2

—

t

+

y2

(0 <

r

<

1), so that
(53)

t,

plus
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and after-tax income is given by
y2

-

t2 — (1

-

r)y2

t*

(54)

Now consider an increase in the income tax

rater

accompanied oy a

reduction in the head tax t* that leaves the expected second-period tax
Because the axpected tax payment is held

payment, E(t2), unchanged.

fixed, this change in tax structure leaves E(y2

-

t2}

unchanged.

However, the increase in r reduces the variance of after-tax income,
var(y2

t2), which

-

is equal to (l-r)2var{y2}.

l.t

follows immediately

from (52) that this reduction in the variance of after-tax income indcces
an increase in first-period consumption.

Thus,

uhen the income insurance

associated with the income tax is increased, there is a decline in
crecautionary saving ,Note, in addition, that this increase in the
income tax rate,

compensated by a decrease in the heed tax, leads to an

increase in expected utility.
The

next step

in the analysis ci fiscal policy is to

examine

agredate income and to specify the relation between individual- income
Let

and aggregate income.

capita

£2

in the second-period,

2

y2

denote the

fevel of aggregate income per

Suppose that individual income, y2, is

a

(55)

where a represents the idiosyncratic random component of income and E(e)
E(e

0.

These assumptions imply that the idiosyncratic component,

a, is uncorrelated with aggregate income Y2.

In examining various tax and transfer policies, one must make sure
that the policy changes satisfy the government's budget constraint.

F-or

simplicity, suppose that all consumers pay the same tax. t1, in period 1
and that all consumers pay the same head tax, t*,

in

period

2.

Second-

period tax bills will differ across consumers to the extent that their
The government budget constraint states

second-period incomes differ

that total tax revenues over the two periods must equal total government
Letting g denote the total value of

spending over the two periods.

government spending, the government's budget constraint is
+

t*

÷

(56)

g

rY2

-The lifetime tax liability of an individual may be calculated by
adding r e to both aides of (56), and using the fact that y2

Y2 + e

to

obtain
t1

+

=

÷

ze

+

g

(57)

Obsenie that the left hand side of (57) is equal to t1

Therefore,

t2.

equation (57), along with (55), can be used to rewrite the

first-order condition (51) as
exp[-kc1]

E(expHk(y1 +

l-r)

- g +

e

-

c1)fl

(58)

To calculate the expectation on the right hand side of (58). the
distributions of the random variables Y2 and e must be specified.
already been assumed that a has a mean equal to zero and that
ln addition, assume that

are uncorrelated.
distributed.

and e

and e are each normally

Under this assumption, the expectation on the rig'nt hand
Simplifying this expression yields

side of (58) can be calculated.
ci

:t has

(1/2)[y1 +
-

E(Y2

-

(1/4)k[VarIY2;

g]
÷

Var((1-r)e

(59)

The consumption function in (59) embodies both the optimizatior. of
the individual consumer as well as the government's budget constraint.
It can

be

used to examine the effects of various fiscal policies

Note
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that the government's budget constraint involves four policy variables:
the first period tax
the second-period head tax t*, the second-period
t1,
income tax rate a, and the total value of government expenditure, g.
However, only two of these four variables, namely g and a, enter the
consumption function in (59).

Thus, consumption in the first-period does

not directly depend on the first-period tax, t1, nor on the second-period

tax t*, Thia obsenation immediately auggeata a policy change for
which the Ricsrdian Equivalence Theorem applies
Consider a one do] lar
incrosse in the first-period tax, t1, accompanied by a decrease in rho
heoct

asrond-period head tax cc, This rhange satisfies the government budgor

constraint,

It

is clear from (59), that since neither of these tax
parameters enters the consumption function, this temporary tax increase
has no effect on consumption.
Next, consider a tax change for which the Ricardian Equivalence
Ihooter, does not apply. In particular, consider an increase in the firs:
Period tax ci that

is

accompanied by an

appropriate decrease in the
recrnd-period income tax rate a, as determined by the government budget
conscrsint, In examining the effacts of this tax policy, it is useful to
focus

on two special cases of the rsndor: processes for income.

First,

oonsider the case in which there is no uncertainty about future aggregate
income Y7.

In this case, which corresponds to the case considered by

Bsrsky, Msnkiw and Zeldes [5], the consumption function in (59) can be
written as
[y1

E(Y2)

-

g

-

(l/2)k(l-r

Vsc(e)]/2

(60)

It follows immediately from (60) chat the increase in
ci and the
accompanying decrease in a will reduce first-period consumption, provided

that Vat

0,

The reason for this reduction in consumption is that

the reduction in the future tax rate r

implies

that the government will

be sharing a smaller fraction of the idiosyncratic income risk.

As a

consequence, the consumer will face a greater income risk and thus will
increase precautionary saving.
is

Alternatively, consider the case in which aggregate income
unc?rtain but there is no idiosyncratic risk (i.e.

0.

varte}

In this

case, the consumption function in '59) can be written as
=

y1

+ E{Y2

-

g

-

(l/2)kVar{Y2)/2

(El)

none of the three tax

In the absence of idiosyncratic income risk
parameters enters the consumption function in (61),

Therefore, an

increase in t1 accompanied by an approprate decrease in r has
on consumption.
case.

Thus,

rio

effect

the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem applies in this

The reason is that

even though there is uncertainty about future

aggregate income and about the tax rate on future income,

there is no

uncertainty about the future tax liability of any consumer.
consumer pays an extra dollar in taxes in period

1.

Each

Therefc.re, the

aggregate tax revenue in period 2 must be reduced by one dollar per
capita.

Because the idiosyncratic component of income has been assumed

to be identically zero, each consumer knows with certainty that his or
her second-period tax bill will be equal to the aggregate per capita tax
bill,

Since the aggregate per capita tax bill will fall by one dollar,

each consumer knows with certainty that his or her future taxes will fall
by one dollar, exactly offsetting the one dollar increase in period 1
taxes.

Therefore, there is no change in the optimal level of first-

period consumption.

if
The

effect of

changes in the tax rate

r

have dramatically different

effects depending on whether the uncertainty associated with second
period income is idiosyncratic or is common to all consumers.

If the

second period income risk is idiosyncratic, then an income tax allows

other, Therefore, a reduction in the
income tax rate would reduce the extent of insurance and would lead to
consumers

to share

risks with

each

inopeased precautionary saving.

By

contrast,

if

there is

no

idiosyncratic component to second period income risk, then individual
In
consno,ers cannot reduce their risks by abating with other consumers
this case, the incone tax does not provide any insurance and the
Ricsrdian Equivalence Theoreo holds, Although aggregate risks cannot be
shored across members of a generation, it is possible that aggregate
risks could be shared across generation. Intergenerational risk sharing

is examined in the next section.
Intergenerational gisk Sharing
Virtually all of the risks diacusaod in previous sections are
within-generational risks in the sense that different members of the
IV.

generation obtain different realizations of a random variable.

same

Except

icc problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, these risks could be
potcntially
section

same

shared among members of the same cohort,

will focus

on

cohort because

risks that cannot be abated

all

members

By contrast, this

among members

of the

of a given cohort face the same risk cx

post as well as ax ante. To be more specific, this section will examine
income shocks

that strike all

members

of a cohort to exactly the

same

degree.

If there is to be any risk sharing, it must be done by sharing

risks among two or more generations.
Intergenerational risk-sharing has been studied by Roger Gordon and
Hal Varian 114]; the discussion below draws heavily on their analysis and
extends their model to allow for population growth.

Consider an econony

with overlapping generations of consumers, each of whom lives for two
perio4a.

Each generation is C times as large as the generation that
A consumer who is born in period t receives a perfectly

preceded it.

storable deterministic endowment
endowment

el

w

in period r and receives a random

Suppose that er+l has a mean of rero and

in period t÷l.

is identically and independently distributed across generations.

simplicity, conaumption is confined to the second period of life.

c+1

For

Let

denote the consumption in period t+l of a consumer born in period t

The realized value of the consumer's utslity in period t+l is
where the utility function u(

;

u(c÷1,

is sr'ictiy increasing and strictly

concave.
All members of generation c
variable e+1.
sharing.

face

the sane wat:e of the random

Therefore, there is no scope for within-generation risk-

Also, because adjacent generations are simultaneously alive for

only one period, there is no scope for private markets to share risks
across memhera of adjacent generations. rherefore, if there is to be
intergenerational risk sharing, then a long-lived institution, aurh as a
government, must be involved.
Consider the following scheme to share risks.
government levies a tax of r

e+i

(where 0

r

Suppose that the

I) on each old consumer

in period t+l. and uses the proceeds of the tax to give a subsidy of r
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e1/G

to each young consuner in period

Of course, if

ta-I,

e÷1

is

negative, then old consumers receive an unlucky realization of income and
the tax levied on old consumers is negative.

Thus, if

e÷1

is negative,

the tax aystem transfers resources from the young consumers to the old
consumers.
consumer

Thus,

In. the presence of this tax

the consumption of an old

in period t±l is

°t+l
this tax

endowment

system,

w

+

two

(lr)et÷1

(62)

spreads the risk associated with the random

scheme

across

(r/O)et

adjacent generations.

n.fl3f,lRi5k Sharing
Now

consider the value of

the tax rate

a that maximizes

the

ox

ante

t

utility

of a generation consumer, Ecu(ct÷1)), where the expectation is
calculata-d at the beginning of the consumer's life, prior to observing

the realization of the random variable e5. This is the tax rate that a
0000u.uer would choose if he had no knowledge of the particular

realirstions ci random income that would occur during his lifetime.
soulstion of the optimal value of a is simplified by using (62) to

The

observe that the expectation of consumption, E(c_+1), is invariant to the
tax rate a (because E(c,
Thus, because the utility function u()
w),
eta
I

-

is concave, the optimal tax rate is the rate that minimizes the
unconditional variance
that

of consumption.

It follows immediately from (62)

the unconditional variance of consumption is

Var(c÷1)

[(a/C)2 + (la)2] Var(e)

(63)

The optimal value of a can be found by differentiating (63) with
respect to a and setting the derivative equal to sero to obtain2
21 The risk sharing scheme is the optimal scheme within the class of
schemes that share the risk associated with
across two adjacent

e

1/il + G-2J

r

(64)

Observe from (64) that in the absence of population growth,
with C —

1,

the optimal value of r is equal to 1/2,

i.e.

In this case,

optimal risk spreading across pairs of adjacent generations involves eacn
generation having a 50% stake in each of the cwo drawings of e that take
place while that generation is alive,

optma1 value of

r is greater than 1/2.

More generally, with G >

1,

the

Substituting the optimal value

of r from (64) into the expression for consumption (62) yields
—

w

+

G/(l+G2)e

+

l/(l+G2)Jet,

(65)

If C is greater than one, then the coefficients on
each less than 1/2.

and

in the presence of population growch,

Thus,

to

possible for generation t
associated with

e

e and et+i.

are
it is

have lass chan a 50% stake in the risk
Each old consumer lays off more than half

of the old-age income risk on rhe younger generation.

However, because

the younger generation has more people than the older generation

it can

absorb this increased risk with an increase in risk per person chat is
smaller than the reduction in risk per old :onsuiner.
B.

Time Consistency

The optimal intergenerational fiscal insurance system presented
above was derived under the assumption that this system will remain in
force.

However, it may turn out that some cohorts may not want to

participate

old

in the fiscal risk-sharing arrangement.

Whet,

a generation is

and receives a positive value of et+l, this generacion would like to

sever its participation.

This type of desire to pull out of a system

will not be considered here.

If these old consumers had, when they were

generations. Gordon and Varian [14] show that sharing the risk across
more generations leads to even higher ex ante utility.
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young, voluntarily decided to participate in the risk-sharing

arrangement,

then they will not he allowed to renege on their implied

contract just because they received a positive value of e,1.
The interesting question concerning the viability of the fiscal
insurance system is whether young consumers in period t will, after
learning the value of

reaon

e,

choose to participate in this system.

they may choose not to participate is that if

e

are required to make a net transfer to old consumers,

The

is negative, they

If the value of

risk reduction provided by th,e fiscal insurance system is less then
the value of the required transfer, then these young consumers will
choose not to participate. However, if the valua of the risk reduction
the

exceeds the

value of the required transfer, then young consumers would

choose to participate in the fiscal insurance system,ZP
Gordon and Varian [14) argue that young consumers in period c vill
refuse cc participate in the fiscal insurance system whenever at <

0.

Their modal assumes a constant population size so, for the moment,
suppose that G

I.

To keep the argument simple, suppose that e, is a

drawing from a finite set and let
a,

First, suppose that at

required to pay

/2

in taxes.

-a,

e

< 0 be the minimum possible value of

In this case,

each young consumer is

If in the following period,

ecu

in,

then each generation t consumer would receive a fiscal subsidy of ,/2 end

22
This analysis assumes that if a generation decides not to
participate in the fiscal insurance system when it is young, then it is
precluded from receiving panenta from a fiscal insurance system when it
is old. Otherwise, if young consumers bedreved that the choice of
whether or not to participate in the fiscal system when young would have
no effect on whether they would receive payments when they were old, then
young consumers would never choose to pay the fiscal insurance tax.

thus would have consumption equal to

w

,

-

which is the same that

consumption would have been without participating in the fiscal system.
However, if in the following period,

-, then

>

e+i

either receive a fiscal subsidy less than

J2

the consumer will

or will pay a tax.

Thus,

the consumer will end up having paid more into the system than he or she
got out of it.

Therefore, the best that the young consumer can hope for

is to-break even by participating in the system, and, in general, the
consumer will be worse off cx post.

Clearly, such a consumer will choose

not to participate in the system in this case,
The argument above establishes that if

e

-a, then the generation

t consumers will not participate in the fiscal insurance system.

suppose that there is some value e*

- such

Now

that the generation t

consumer will choose to participate in the system if and only if e > e*.
It is now straightforward to demonstrate, by contradiction, that e*
cannot be negative.

Suppose that

e

In this situation a young

e* < 0.

generation t consumer is required to pay

e*j/2,

consumer receive in the following period?

If

ut

e+l

how much will the

< e*, then the

generation t÷l consumers will not join the system, and hence the
generation t consumer will receive nothing from the fiscal insurance
system.

If et+l

>

e*, then the generation t consumer will either receive

a subsidy smaller than Ie*I/2 or will pay a taK.

In either of these

situations, the consumer is worse off for having participated in the
fiscal insurance system.

Only if

e1

—

e*

will the generation t

consumer end up as well off under the fiscal insurance system as without
it.

Thus, as above, the consumer cannot possibly be made better off by
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joining the fiscal insurance system and will, in general, he made worse
off.

Therefore, he or she will not join.

Thus, e* cannot be negative.

Gordon and Varian discuss mechanisms that would avoid the repeal of
the intergenerational fiscal- ins'rance system.

For example, if large

enough costs are imposed on any young cohort that tries to repeal tha
fiscal insurance system, then no generation will ever repeal the system,

and,i

equilibrium the costs will not have to be borne,

For example, if

the abandonment of the fiscal insurance system leads to economic or

social upheaval, then the young generation may decide that the costs
axceed any pecuniary gains from avoiding partiripation in the fiscal
!nsurance system.
In addition to the mechanisms discussed by Gordon and Varian for
sustaining a fiscal insurance system,

there is the possibility that

population growth can sustain the system.

If all generations have the

same nuoher of consumers, then the size of the maximum transfer paid by a
consumer

consumer could

is

equal to the size of the

maximum

transfer that this

possibly receive when old, Therefore, as argued above.

when a young consumer is required to make

the maximum possible transfec,

the consumer cannot possibly expect to benefit from participating in the
fiscal insurance system.

However, if each generation is G times as large

as the preceding generation, then the largest transfer that can be
received by an old consumer is G times as large as the largest transfer
that a young consumer could be required to make,

Thus,

even if a young

consumer had to pay the largest possible transfer, it is still possible
that the consumer could receive an even larger transfer in the following
period.

Depending on the consumer's attitude toward risk, it may turn

out that even faced with the largest required payment when young, the
consumer would choose to participate in the fiscal insurance system.
To demonstrate that population growth may be able to sustain
voluntary participation in the fiscal insurance system, it may be clearer
to use a numerical example than an algebraic proof.

Suppose chat each

generation is twice as large as the generation preceding it, i.e.
In

t,his case,

,

0

2.

it follows from (64) that an optimal fiscal insurance

equal

system will set r

to 4/5.

Substituting C

4/5

2 and r

into the

equation for consumption (62) yields

w

+ 0.4

e.,

0.2

(66)

et÷1

The value of consumption in (66) is based on the assumption that
the fiscal insurance system remains intact,
w

As an example, suppose that

11 and that there are only three possible values for

10.

Assume that e

-10 and e

denote this common probability.
l-2q.

c

corresponds to a value of

-10, 0, and

10 are equally probable and let q < 1/2
Therefore, the probability that e

Thus, since consumption, c+i, depends on

nine possible value of

e:

e

and e±i,

which are displayed in Table

1.

0

i

there are
Eaco row

e and each column corresponds to a value ci

e+l.
Consider a young consumer in period t and suppose that et

-10, cc

that this young consumer is faced with paying the largest possible
transfer.

To determine whether this consumer will choose cc participate

in the fiscal system, the values of consumption in the first row of Table
1 must be compared with the values of

participate in the system.

c1

if the consumer does not

These values are shown in Table

2.
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Comparing the values of consumption in the first row of Table 1
with the values of consumption in Table 2, it is clear that neither row
dominates the other in a stochastic dominance sense.
the fiscal insurance system,

consumption from 200q to

Sq

consumption from 11 to 7.

By participating in

the consumer reduces the variance of
at the cost of reducing the expected value of

Whether a consumer views the reduction in risk

as sgoath the price depends on his or her attitude toward risk and on the
value of q.

Clearly the more aversion the consumer has to risk

the note

attractive is the fiscal insurance system.
Suppose that the utility function is u(c)
is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.

k

Assume that q

whero k
0.25.

ii

I, then the expected utility if the consumer participates in the

fiscal insurance system is -2,17;

the expected utility if the consumer

does not participate in the aystem is
sustained

by

all

91.97.

Thus, the system will ho

generations voluntarily choose to

rarticipate in the fiscal insurance.
higher

-

voluntary participation is this case.

In the example above,

a

l000exp[-kc]

utility

Secause

all

generations obtain

with the introduction of the fiscal insurance system, such

system is Pareto-improving.

In this particular example, the net rate

of return on savings is zero, so that using the notation from section II,

R

1.

Therefore, in this example, R

<

C so that Golden Rule

consideratioms indicate that a Pareto-improvement could be achieved by
increasing consumption and reducing saving.

The determination of the

optimal fiscal system, which might include both an element of
intergenerational risk sharing and an element of lump-sum

6
intergenerational transfers to stimulate consumption, remains an open
question for research.

V.

Concluding Remarks

This paper has analyzed the effects of various fiscal
policies in
situations in which individual consumers face various sorts of risks.

Metoologically,
neoclassical

the research presented in this
paper is quite

Although the models employed in this paper are very much

in the spirit of those embraced by the so-called new classical school of
macroeconomics, the results differ quite dramatically from some of the
most well-known new classical results.

In particular, the Ricarian

Equivalence Theorem, which essentially states that lump-sum tax policies
have no effect

is an important result that pervades much of the new

classical literature.
importantly

The results reported in this paper often deviate

from the RLcardian Equivalence Theorem. The departures from

the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, and hence the effects of fiscal
policy, depend importantly on the availability and the nature of
insurance

arrangements to protect individual consumers against various

types of risk.

It is perhaps ironic that the traditional Keynesian

model, which emphasizes the effects of fiscal policy, has no place for
insurance arrangements to interact with fiscal policy.

it is in the

neoclassical framework, which is based on the optimizing behavior of
consumers facing risk, that the interattion of insurance and fiscal
policy becomes apparent,

Further research into the nature and evolution

of insurance arrangements will help to extend
understanding of the
effects of fiscal policy.
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Table 1
Values of

under the fiscal insurance system

l0

10

0

e's

l0

5

7

9

0

9

11

13

10

13

15

17

Table 2
Values of °t+l in absence of fiscal insurance

e1:

ct÷l:

l0

1

0

10

11

21
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